China’s Ministry of Finance has announced 10 trillion yuan (US$1.38 trillion) of new measures to alleviate debt burdens on local governments at the end of a weeklong meeting earlier this month by the National People’s Congress Standing Committee.
The ministry announced that the central government will increase the local government debt limit by 6 trillion yuan (US$830 billion) over three years, by 2 trillion yuan a year, as well as issuing 4 trillion of special local government bonds over the next five years starting in 2024 to finance the repayment of “hidden debt.”
According to Finance Minister Lan Fo’an, this will reduce the local government “hidden debt” burden from 14.3 trillion yuan (US$1.98 trillion) to 2.3 trillion yuan before 2028, “greatly reducing” the pressure they are under.
The move enables local authorities to make more of their debt transparent to banks, markets and policy-makers, and to refinance.
What do they mean by hidden debt?
China makes a distinction between borrowing by the central government in Beijing and debt incurred by local governments when implementing its policies at the provincial, municipal, county and township level.
To ensure local governments had enough financial resources to take part in nationwide infrastructure programs in the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis, the ruling Chinese Communist Party allowed them to set up local government financing vehicles, also known as local financing platforms.
These government-backed investment companies were allowed to issue local bonds and to apply for bank loans to finance infrastructure projects that boosted local property values and with them government revenue from property sales and usage fees.
But their debts never appeared on the books of local governments.
In 2014, Beijing allowed local governments to borrow directly, mostly in the form of bonds, to reduce their dependence on these local platforms.
By 2018, it was warning that it wouldn‘t bail out local government finance vehicles if they faced bankruptcy, while boosting local governments’ share of sales taxes.
How much hidden borrowing has there been?
Local governments were required to invest in large-scale infrastructure projects as part of a 2008 fiscal stimulus plan worth around 4 trillion yuan (US$552 billion) under former President Hu Jintao, and either issued bonds or sought bank loans via local financing platforms.
The International Monetary Fund estimates that total debts incurred through such platforms by local governments in China totaled 60 trillion yuan (US$8.3 trillion) by the end of 2023, or 47.6% of GDP, Reuters reported.
Around 30% is in the form of bonds, with around 60% in bank loans, according to Chen Sung-hsing, adjunct professor of Chinese studies at Taiwan’s Chinese Culture University.
What about revenue from taxation?
Fiscal revenue has been on the decline in China since 2015, but the bursting of the real estate bubble has hit local governments even harder, removing much of their income from the sale of land usage right and property-related taxes.
According to Tianlei Huang of the Petersen Institute for Economics, the share of land sale revenue in total local government revenue increased from almost 20% in 2012 to 30% in 2021.
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Combined revenue from land usage rights and property taxes accounted for 38% of total fiscal revenue for all local governments in China in 2021, Huang said in a recent research report, adding that attempts to impose financing restrictions on developers triggered the current property slump. Land-related income accounted for 27% of total local government revenue in 2023.
Across China, taxation revenue fell to just 16.8% of GDP in 2022 from 22.18% a year earlier, and that proportion is likely to fall further in 2023 and 2024.
“Due to financial difficulties, some local governments have tried to increase fiscal revenue through illegal charges, but it is still far from enough to service their debts,” Sung told RFA Mandarin in a recent interview.
Will the latest measures resolve the problem?
Not necessarily. The central government’s plan will only kick the can further down the road, as local governments borrow more money simply to service existing debt.
Despite the rhetoric from Beijing, allowing the local financing vehicles to go bankrupt could have catastrophic consequences.
“If local governments can’t repay their debts, then that puts the banks at risk of bankruptcy, which could trigger a systemic financial crisis,” former Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region government official Du Wen said.
“If the Chinese financial system collapses, the Chinese Communist Party regime will fall, as people lose all of their money and start to rebel,” he warned.
Yet it’s unclear whether a consensus has been reached in the corridors of Zhongnanhai on how to move forward from here; whether to curb spending or engage in more public spending to fuel economic growth.
“It’s important when handling a financial crisis to act in a timely manner, and to take measures on a large enough scale,” Chen said. “But the Chinese central government seems ... unable to decide between austerity and large-scale stimulus, and hesitates whenever it introduces a new policy.”
“This indecision means that it will cost even more to solve the problem.”
Translated by Luisetta Mudie.