On Nov. 19, Sok Chenda Sophea, who was only brought in as Cambodia’s foreign minister last year, was given the heave-ho and replaced by his predecessor, Prak Sokhonn.
The previous day, the urbane and much-praised Saleumxay Kommasith was dismissed as the foreign minister of Laos and demoted upstairs to the Prime Minister’s Office.
It is unusual for foreign ministers in both countries to be reshuffled.
Sok Chenda Sophea was only the third foreign minister since the ruling Cambodian People’s Party cemented its power in 1998; Saleumxay was only the fourth foreign minister since the communist takeover in Laos in 1975.
In one interpretation, Saleumxay was merely a casualty of an ongoing carve-up of the ruling Lao People’s Revolutionary Party by the Siphadones and Phomvihanes, the two most important political clans.
It is expected that 2025 will be a year of horse trading and in-fighting between grandees ahead of the National Congress in January 2026, when the party’s new five-year leadership is announced.
Saleumxay was replaced by Thongsavanh Phomvihane, previously head of the ruling communist party’s foreign policy commission and brother of the National Assembly chair, Saysomphone Phomvihane.
Saysomphone stands a good chance of becoming the next party chief, but there are still doubts about whether Prime Minister Sonexay Siphandone, the scion of the Siphandone clan, will get a second term.
Uncertain geopolitics ahead
Once considered the party’s “crown prince,” Sonexay’s reputation has suffered badly because of his handling of Laos’s ongoing economic catastrophe, which shows no signs of improving.
Saleumxay was seen by some as a challenger to Sonexay, especially after impressing this year as the minister who guided Laos’s ASEAN chairmanship.
Yet, he was not universally popular within the ruling communist party. Many apparatchiks perceived him as an aloof, independent-minded upstart who rose too quickly.
Removing Saleumxay increases Sonexay’s chances of keeping his job. Putting a Phomvihane in the foreign ministry also increases that family’s influence, too.
Beyond domestic political concerns, the removal of the two foreign ministers comes as their governments prepare for more uncertain times internationally.
According to Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Manet, Prak’s reappointment will increase the “government’s capabilities” amid intensifying geopolitical tensions.
Prak is an experienced diplomat accustomed to fighting Cambodia’s corner amid new Cold War rivalries, whereas Sok Chenda Sophea was principally an economics-minded functionary – appointed last year because he wasn’t geopolitically-minded.
The neophyte Hun Manet administration wanted a foreign minister who would focus entirely on increasing trade and investment, which was Sok Chenda Sophea’s sole remit as the former head of Cambodia’s investment council.
Under Sok Chenda, the foreign ministry shifted many of its diplomatic duties, allowing it to concentrate on tapping foreign governments for more money.
That left other ruling party grandees like Hun Manet and his father, Hun Sen, still in power in Phnom Penh, to operate their own foreign policy – pursuing controversial issues, like the territorial disputes with neighboring Vietnam and Thailand, that could impair economic relations.
Trump tariffs
Phnom Penh presumably thinks this dual system is no longer workable. Donald Trump’s return as U.S. president in 2025 means Washington will no longer separate geopolitics from trade, so it makes little sense for Phnom Penh to do so, either.
Moreover, it knows it will face a much more hostile relationship with the incoming Trump administration, with its threatened blanket 10-20% tariff on global imports when the U.S. is the largest purchaser of Cambodian goods.
Trump also will bring Marco Rubio in as secretary of state. Washington’s leading China hawk is expected to take a much tougher stance on Beijing’s partners in Asia, such as Cambodia, and on mainland Southeast Asia’s vast scam industry that is increasingly victimizing U.S. citizens.
Unlike Sok Chenda Sophea, Prak is more of a ruling-party partisan who can push back against U.S. criticism. Presumably, Phnom Penh realizes it’ll soon have to wade into a new fight with Washington, making it even more important to be on the best terms with Beijing.
Beijing won’t be displeased by Prak’s return.
Attuned to Beijing
China is believed to have grown weary with some of the princelings installed in Hu Manet’s cabinet during last year’s vast generational succession process.
It has been lobbying for the return of Prak, an old-style politician who understands how Beijing prefers things to be done.
In Vientiane, Saleumxay did a good job in recent years of pitching Laos to the rest of the world, including the West, and as the only fluent English speaker in the Politburo was key to securing some important development assistance packages from Japan, the U.S., and European states.
Yet Laos’s dire economic situation, particularly its massive debts to China, isn’t improving, and only Beijing has the ability to assist meaningfully.
A damning report by the IMF published last week noted that Laos’s economy “critically relies on the continued extension of debt relief from China.” Vientiane knows it must narrow its foreign relations again to focus squarely on China.
Indeed, the communist party is eager to find a more senior role for pro-Beijing figures like Sommath Pholsena, currently a deputy president of the National Assembly and a childhood friend of Xi Jinping, China’s president. He’ll likely be the next National Assembly chair.
Thongsavanh Phomvihane, the new foreign minister, started his career at Laos’s embassy in Beijing, has closer ties to the Chinese Communist Party, and is more of a party loyalist than Saleumxay.
Like Prak, he’s an older, more traditional and safer pair of hands, someone who understands what Beijing wants and how to provide that.
David Hutt is a research fellow at the Central European Institute of Asian Studies (CEIAS) and the Southeast Asia Columnist at the Diplomat. He writes the Watching Europe In Southeast Asia newsletter. The views expressed here are his own and do not reflect the position of RFA.